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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REAL ESTATE
ATTACHMENTS
Attachment,1 garnishment,2 and mechanic's liens- are remedies which
creditors often use to enforce their rights against debtors. With increasing
I Attachment has traditionally served the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction over a de-
fendant who is otherwise outside the jurisdiction of a court and insuring that there will be
property available to satisfy the judgment if the plaintiff prevails in an action. Historically,
there was no need for special circumstances in order to obtain a writ of attachment. Today
attachment, if available, is often used as a tactical maneuver to put pressure on a defendant
to reach an expeditious settlement of a legal dispute. See NEw YORK JUDICIAL COUNCIL,
SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT 391-93 (1941) [hereinafter cited as SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT]. See
also R. WAPPLES, A TREATISE ON GARNISHMENT AND ATTACHMENT 18 (1895) [hereinafter cited
as GARNISHMENT AND ATACHMENT] (predominant rationale for use of attachment is inade-
quacy of process). Attachment statutes are either limited or unlimited. Unlimited attach-
ment statutes allow attachment of property without showing the existence of special circum-
stances. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-279 (West Supp. 1979); ME. Rav. STAT. ANN.
tit. 14, § 4151 (1964). See also SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra at 397-98. Limited attach-
ment statutes allow attachment only upon the showing of a special circumstance, such as
non-residence of the defendant, fraudulent concealment of the defendant or his property or
the defendant's anticipated departure from the jurisdiction. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 11,
§ 1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); Ky. REv. STAT. § 425.301 (Supp. 1978); Wyo. STAT. § 1-15-101
(1977). See also J. CBBErrr, CASES AND MATERIALS ON JUDICIAL REMEDIES 675-77 (1954).
Two different attachment statutes may apply in the same state, depending on whether the
property belongs to a resident or a non-resident. Id. at 675. Prior to 1971, all states, except
Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Vermont had limited
attachment statutes. Two states, Hawaii and Montana, permitted attachment in any action
based on express or implied contracts. See S. MORGANSTERN, LEGAL PROTECTION IN GARNISH-
MENT AND ATTACHMENT 70-89 (1971) [hereinafter cited as MORGANSTERN]. See also Pennoyar
v. Kelsey, 150 N.Y. 77, 79-81, 44 N.E. 788, 789 (1896) (comparison of attachment under
common law and statutory attachment in New York); SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra at
393-95 (origin of attachment); J. DANIEL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF ATrACHMENT UNDER THE
CODE OF VIRGINIA 20-26 (1869) (historical development of attachment in Virginia); Com-
ment, Due Process and Prejudgment Attachment in California, 10 SANTA CLARA LAW. 99,
99-100 (1969) (account of historical development of attachment).
In England, attachment, especially attachment without a prior hearing, seems to have
fallen into disfavor and attachment of the property of an absent owner has been completely
abolished. Attachment is not used often in the United States and the remedy has followed
the pattern of England in the late nineteenth century before foreign attachment was abol-
ished. Levy, Attachment, Garnishment and Execution: Some American Problems Consid-
ered in Light of the English Experience, 5 CONN. L. REV. 399, 453 (1972). See also C.
DRAKE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SUITS BY ATTACHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES §§ 4-5
(1891) (attachment much less available in England as opposed to United States because
division of the United States into many political subdivisions created need to secure prop-
erty of debtors within each subdivision).
2 Garnishment is a specialized form of attachment in which funds held for or owed to
the defendant by another are attached. See MORGANSTERN, supra note 1, at 2. See dlso
GARNISHMENT AND ATTACHMENT, supra note 1 at 256-336 (traditional grounds for garnish-
ment); Comment, Wage Garnishment: Still Driving the Wage-Earning Family to the Wall,
17 SANTA CLARA LAW. 631, 633-36 (1977) (historical development of garnishment). Garnish-
ment is often utilized to put pressure on a debtor to make other arrangements with his
creditors, such as an agreement to pay the amount of a debt or judgment in installments.
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frequency, however, creditors are attacking these remedies as violative of
rights to due process of law guaranteed under the fifth4 and fourteenth5
amendments. The resultant litigation has created uncertainty as to the
constitutional safeguards required for attachment, garnishment and
mechanic's lien proceedings. Judicial uncertainty is particularly acute in
the area of real estate attachments. Real estate attachment seldom de-
prives the owner of actual possession, use or enjoyment of his land. The
owner's continuing possession of attached land raises the question of
whether attachment of real estate is actually a deprivation of property
and therefore subject to the same due process requirements that pertain
to attachment of chattels and the garnishment of obligations.e
The Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality of attach-
ment and garnishment statutes in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.7 In
Sniadach, the Court held a statute" providing for the pre-judgment gar-
nishment of wages without notice to the garnishee or a pre-attachment
hearing unconstitutional.' In 1972, the Court greatly broadened the scope
EXEMPTIONS UNDER THE GARNISHMENT ACT 26-27 (1979). A number of common law jurisdic-
tions, most notably New Brunswick, South Australia and New Zealand, prohibit the gar-
nishment of wages. Id. at 6.
1 The word "lien" generally is used to denote a claim which one person has upon the
property of another for some debt or charge. See E. WALKER, F. WALKER AND T.
ROHDENBURG, LEGAL PITFALLS IN ARCHITECTURE, ENGINEERING AND THE CONSTRUCTION PRO-
CESS 204 (2d ed. 1979). Mechanic's liens are statutory. Id. at 205. Generally, a mechanic's
lien is a security interest granted to one whose labor has improved property. The security
interest exists only in the specific property improved and only to the extent of any debt
owed the improver by the owner of the improved property or someone who has authority to
bind the owner. See J. SWEET, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARCHITECTURE, ENGINEERING AND THE CON-
STRUCTION PROCESS 81-82 (2d ed. 1977).
' U.S. CONST., amend. V reads in relevant part: "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law ... "
' U.S. CONST. amend. XIV reads in relevant part: "... nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty or property without due process of law . . ." Generally, the rights
guaranteed by the fifth amendment have been incorporated into the fourteenth amendment
and are thus binding on the states. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969) (fifth
amendment prohibitions of double jeopardy binding on states); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 341-42 (1963) (fifth amendment "no deprivation of property" without due process
clause applicable to states through fourteenth amendment) (dictum); Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897) (fifth amendment restraint on exercise of
eminent domain binding on states).
' The Supreme Court has not addressed the question of the constitutionality of real
estate attachment statutes. Lower federal courts usually cite decisions by the Court dealing
with attachment of chattels and garnishment to support analogous arguments concerning
the constitutionality of real estate attachments. See, e.g., MPI, Inc. v. McCullough, 463 F.
Supp. 887, 901 (N.D. Miss. 1978); Terranova v. Avco Finc'l Servs., 396 F. Supp. 1402, 1407
(D. Vt. 1975); Hillhouse v. City of Kan. City. 221 Kan. 369, - , 559 P.2d 1148, 1152-53
(1977); McIntyre v. Associates Finc'l. Servs., 367 Mass. 708, - , 328 N.E.2d 492, 494 (1975).
See text accompanying notes 29-60, infra.
" 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
8 WIS. STAT. § 267.04(1), .07(1), .18(2) (1965). See also Wisc. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE
BUREAU, INFO. BULL. No. 64-2, GARNISHMENT IN WISCONSIN (1964) (detailed account of utili-
zation and applicability of Wisconsin garnishment statutes at time of Sniadach decision).
9 395 U.S. at 342. Under the Wisconsin garnishment statute, the court clerk issued a
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of Sniadach in Fuentes v. Shevin.10 The Court declared statutes1 pro-
viding for pre-judgment attachment of chattels unconstitutional, except
where there is a special need for very prompt action, the seizure is neces-
sary to further an important public interest, and the person initiating the
seizure is a government official. 12 Arguably, Fuentes implied that an at-
tachment statute is unconstitutional unless the owner of the attached
property has an opportunity for a pre-seizure hearing. 3
In Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,' 4 however, the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality"5 of a Louisiana attachment statute which permits
attachment without a prior hearing.'8 The Louisiana attachment proce-
dure under scrutiny in Mitchell differs significantly from the attachment
summons to the garnishee at the request of the creditor's attorney. Issuance of the sum-
mons effected the garnishment. Id. at 338-39. Apparently, there was no opportunity for a
hearing under the Wisconsin statute until the trial of the case on which the garnishment
was based. Id. at 339. The Supreme Court observed that the Wisconsin garnishment statute
gave defendants no opportunity to tender any defense that they might have prior to the
trial date. Id. In the latter portion of the Sniadach opinion, the Court relied heavily on
Congressional materials dealing with the effects of wage garnishment on the poor. Id. at
340-41.
After Sniadach several lower federal courts held attachment and garnishment proce-
dures unconstitutional. See, e.g., Collins v. Viceroy Hotel Corp., 338 F. Supp. 390, 392, 396-
98 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (attachment of personal property by hotel proprietor); Laprease v.
Raymors Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716, 718-20, 722-24 (N.D.N.Y. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 991 (1971) (attachment of furniture purchased from plaintiffs on installment contract
without opportunity for prior hearing); Swarb v. Lennox, 315 F. Supp. 1091, 1094, 1100-01
(E.D. Pa. 1970) (denial of notice and hearing prior to attachment of property invalidates
attachment in absence of valid confession of judgment).
:0 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
1' FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 76.01, .07, .08, .10, .13 (West 1964 & Supp. 1979) (§ 76.08
amended 1978); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1821 (Purdon, 1967) (repealed 1978). The Florida
and Pennsylvania attachment statutes differed only in that the Florida statute required the
plaintiff to institute a legal action for recovery of the property attached in order for the
attachment to remain in effect. Under the Pennsylvania statute, the attachment could re-
main in effect indefinitely since the person requesting the attachment was under no obliga-
tion to initiate legal action for possession of the attached property.
12 407 U.S. at 96-97.
IS See Young, Supreme Court Report, 58 A.B.A.J. 858, 863 (1972); Comment, Foreign
Attachment After Sniadach And Fuentes, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 342, 343-44 (1973); Note, The
Supreme Court, 1971 Term, Due Process, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 94-95 (1972); Note, Recent
Developments, 6 IND. L. REv. 523, 605 (1973); Note, Constitutional Law-Due Pro-
cess-Pre-hearing Seizures of Property under Pennsylvania and Florida Replevin Statutes
is a Taking of Property without Due Process of Law, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 733, 736 (1973);
Comment, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction-Due Process Requirements, 82 YALsE L.J. 1023,
1026-31 (1973). But see Note, Constitutional Law-Debtor-Creditor Relations-Fuentes v.
Shevin: Due Process for Debtors, 51 N.C. L. REv. 111, 121 (1972).
4 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
15 Id. at 619-20.
6 LA. CODE CiV. PRO. ANN. art. 281-283, 325, 2373, 3501, 3504, 3506-3508, 3510, 3576
(West 1960). Although Louisiana law provided that a writ of attachment could be issued by
a clerk of court, the authority to issue writs of attachment was limited to judges in the
parish in which the defendant in Mitchell resided. 416 U.S. at 605-06, 606 n.5. Conse-
quently, in Mitchell the Supreme Court did not rule on the validity of writs of attachment
1980]
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statutes involved in Fuentes. The Louisiana procedure provides for judi-
cial approval of applications for attachment and provides for an immedi-
ate post-seizure hearing at which the owner of the attached property may
seek dissolution of the attachment. The Court held that such safeguards
satisfy the requisites of due process. 17 Mitchell was thought by some com-
mentators to overrule Fuentes and to limit the effect of Sniadach to gar-
nishment,18 but this view proved erroneous. 19 In Calero-Toledo v. Pear-
son Yacht Leasing Corp.,20  the Supreme Court sustained the
constitutionality of Puerto Rican statutess2 providing for forfeiture, with-
out prior notice or hearing, of vessels used for unlawful purposes. 22 The
extraordinary circumstances exception of Fuentes formed the basis for
the Court's decision.2s In 1975, in North Georgia Finishing Inc. v. Di
Chem, 24 the Supreme Court held a Georgia garnishment procedures 5
unconstitutional.
26
issued by court clerks. Id. at 606 n.5. At the time of the decision, Mitchell marked a retreat
from the Supreme Court's holding in Fuentes that an opportunity for a hearing is required
before every attachment. See Anderson and Guidry, Recognition of Creditor's Rights, 80
CoM. L.J. 63, 65 (1975); Note, Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.: Procedural Due Process Reexam-
ined, 35 LA. L. REV. 221, 229 (1974). The Mitchell decision also has been interpreted as
implying that a balancing of the interests of the debtor and creditor should take place as
opposed to having a checklist of specific procedural features which are necessary in order for
an attachment statute to be constitutional. See Comment, Debtor and Creditor Due Pro-
cess: Applying the Balancing Standard, 29 U. FLA. L. REv. 554, 559-60 (1977).
17 416 U.S. at 616-20.
18 See, e.g., Pearson, Due Process and the Debtor: The Impact of Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant, 28 OKLA. L. REv. 743, 753-57 (1975).
I" See Jonnet v. Dollar Say. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1127, 1130 (3d Cir. 1976) (Fuentes
analysis continued to retain some vitality after Mitchell; Di-Chem, to a certain extent, re-
suscitated Fuentes).
20 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
22 P.R. LAWs ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2512(a)(4), 2512(b) (Supp. 1978), tit. 34, § 1722 (1971).
'2 In Calero-Toledo, the plaintiff had leased a yacht to alleged drug traffickers and the
yacht was seized by Puerto Rican police following the discovery of marijuana on board. 416
U.S. at 665. The government conceded that the owners of the yacht were completely inno-
cent of any wrongdoing. Id. at 668. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held the seizure consti-
tutional on grounds that such seizures might induce persons to prevent the use of their
property for criminal purposes by exercising greater care in leasing and otherwise transfer-
ring their property. Id. at 686-88. Obviously, the policies behind the pre-hearing seizures
involved in Calero-Toledo (crime prevention) differ significantly from those which underlie
pre-judgment attachments. See note 1 supra.
23 416 U.S. at 677-68. See text accompanying notes 11-12 supra.
24 419 U.S. 601 (1975). The facts in Di-Chem differ significantly from those in Snia-
dach, Fuentes and Mitchell. Di-Chem involved a corporate defendant, while in the latter
cases the defendants were consumers whose individual property had been attached or wages
garnished. This distinction diepels any notion that due process requirements apply only to
attachments involving a great disparity in bargaining power between plaintiff and defen-
dant, as in a finance company action against an impoverished consumer.
25 See GA. CoDE ANN. §§ 46-101 to -104 (1933).
26 419 U.S. at 606-07. The effect of Di-Chem on the validity of attachment statutes is
uncertain. Di-Chem arguably requires that attachment statutes provide either for notice and
an opportunity for a hearing before pre-judgment seizure of property or compliance with
various procedural safeguards, such as those which the Supreme Court discussed in Mitch-
REAL ESTATE ATTACHMENTS
Thus, on the basis of Sniadach and its progeny, due process imposes
two requirements in regard to the constitutionality of attachment stat-
utes. The owner of the attached property must be afforded a prompt,
post-seizure hearing. Approval of the attachment by a judicial officer is
also required.27 Whether these procedural requirements apply to attach-
ments of real estate is unclear. The Supreme Court hs never specifically
considered the constitutionality of real estate attachment, and lower fed-
eral courts have reached divergent conclusions.
The most important question in regard to the attachment of real es-
tate is whether the attachment of land is the taking of a significant prop-
erty interest within the meaning of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments.2 8 In In re Northwest Homes of Chehalis,;9 the Ninth Circuit relied
heavily on the Supreme Court's summary affirmation of the decision of a
federal district court in Spielrian-Fond, Inc. v. Hanson's Inc.s0 in holding
that real estate attachments do not constitute the taking of'a significant
ell. See Hansford, Procedural Due Process in the Creditor-Debtor Relationship: The Im-
pact of Di-Chem, 9 GA. L. REv. 589, 608-09 (1975). Perhaps the most significant require-
ment of Di-Chem is that an affidavit of facts must accompany a request for attachment.
Consequently, creditors may no longer use the attachment process to gain leverage against
debtors since judges will have broad discretion in the issuance of attachments. Di-Chem will
probably result in fewer attachments. See Note, North Georgia Finishing v. Di-Chem: Pre-
judgment Due Process Redefined, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 1013, 1022-23 (1975). Given Di-Chem's
heavy reliance on Fuentes, the Supreme Court may have wanted to retain a requirement for
pre-seizure hearings when property in which the creditor has no security interest is at-
tached. See Zaretsky, Attachment without Seizure: A Proposal for a New Creditor's Rem-
edy, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 819, 830-33 [hereinafter cited as ZARETSKY].
Di-Chem arguably injected even more confusion into the law of attachments, See
Steinheimer, Summary Pre-Judgement Creditor's Remedies and Due Process of Law's
Continuing Uncertainty After Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 79, 95
n.49 (1975). However, Di-Chem may have clarified the status of attachment statutes. The
different results in Mitchell and Di-Chem are justified in light of the specific fact situations
in the two cases. For instance, a post-seizure hearing was immediately available in Mitchell,
while the Di-Chem garnishment statute provided no such remedy. Also, in Mitchell, unlike
Di-Chem, a judicial officer issued the writ of attachment. See note 16 supra.
Attempts have been made to reconcile Sniadach, Fuentes, Mitchell and Di-Chem by
asserting that the Supreme Court used a balancing of interests test in deciding these cases.
In Mitchell, the creditor sold the attached property to the debtor under an installment
payment plan. Since the debtor allegedly had not completed payment and the creditor had
a financial interest in the attached property, the balance was arguably in his favor. In
Sniadach and Di-Chem, however, the creditors did not have a direct financial interest in the
attached property. Thus the court found the property owners' right to be more compelling
than the creditors' interest in attachment. See ZARETSKY, supra at 831.
Following Di-Chem, state and lower federal courts held various attachment statutes
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Johnson v. American Credit Corp., 581 F.2d 526, 534 (5th Cir.
1978) (GA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-109, -114 (1933)); Mississippi Chemical Corp. v. Chemical Con-
str. Corp., 444 F. Supp. 925, 945 (S.D. Miss. 1977) (MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-31-1 (1972));
Aaron Ferer and Sons Co. v. Berman, 431 F. Supp. 847, 852-53 (D. Neb. 1977) (NE. REV.
STAT. §§ 25-1001, 1002 (1975)); Briere v. Agway, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 654, 661 (D. Vt. 1977)
(VT. R. CIV. PRO. 4.1 (1958), VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3351, 3352 (1964)); Unique Caterers,
Inc. v. Rudy's Farm Co., 338 So. 2d 1067, 1071 (Fla. 1976) (FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 76.01-.37
(West 1964)).
2 See notes 4 & 5 supra & note 36, infra.
526 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 907 (1976).
SO 379 F. Supp. 997 (D. Ariz. 1973), aff'd mem., 417 U.S. 901 (1974).
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property interest.31 In Spielman, the Arizona mechanic's lien statute2
was held constitutional on the grounds that the placing of a mechanic's
lien on real property is not such a significant deprivation of property as to
invoke the protection of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.3 3
Spielman however, no longer appears to be strong precedent because
the case predates Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co. " The Spielman court possi-
bly faced the choice of ordering cumbersome prior hearings or failing to
provide procedural safeguards for the imposition of mechanic's liens on
real property.35 Thus, the court avoided requiring hearings prior to the
imposition of mechanic's liens by deciding that the imposition of a
mechanic's lien on real property does not represent the taking of a consti-
tutionally significant property interest.
The district court's holding in Spielman is further weakened by the
expanded definition of property entitled to fifth and fourteenth amend-
ment protection. 6 Spielman ignores this expanded definition of prop-
31 526 F.2d at 506.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-981 to -1006 (1974 & Supp. 1979-80).
" 379 F. Supp. at 999.
', Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974). The date of the Spielman decision
is September 12, 1973.
3' See Comment, Constutitionality of Mechanic's Lien Statutes, 34 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 1067, 1079-81 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Constitutionality of Mechanic's Liens].
3 Property has always been a nebulous concept. Traditional definitions of property em-
phasize the owner's exclusive right of possession of anything physical and tangible. See
Note, Statutory Entitlement and the Concept of Property, 86 YALE L.J. 695, 700 n.31
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Statutory Entitlement]. Various objects, rights and privileges
presently are considered to be property. See Libling, The Concept of Property-Property
Intangible, 94 L.Q. REv. 103, 111-13, 118-19 (1978) (person who creates commercial value of
any entity, tangible or intangible, through expenditure of time, labor, effort or money, has
proprietary interest in such entity); Weinberg, Tort Claims as Intangible Property: An Ex-
planation from an Assignee's Perspective, 64 Ky. L.J. 49, 50-53, 98 (1975) (property related
torts are intangible property which can be transmitted by assignment); Comment, The
Right of Publicity-Protection for Public Figures and Celebrities, 42 BROOKLYN L. Rv.
527, 530 (1976) (celebrities have a property right in their names and likenesses).
During recent years, the most dramatic expansion of the definition of property in the
U.S. has occurred in regard to statutory entitlements or privileges granted by the govern-
ment, such as welfare payments, driver's licenses, etc. See Reich, The New Property, 73
YALE L.J. 733, 734-37, 783-84 (1964) (suggesting that as individuals come to rely on various
types of government largesse, rights to this largesse should be afforded the same protection
as private property rights). See also Reich, Indiviaul Rights and Social. Welfare: The
Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). The Supreme Court expanded the defini-
tion of property to include various types of government largesse. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565, 573-74 (1975) (students have property right to public education protected by
fourteenth amendment); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (implying that retention of
driver's license is property right protected by fourteenth amendment); Goldberg v. Kelley,
397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (property rights exist in welfare benefits, requiring notice and op-
portunity for hearing prior to termination of benefits). Two definitions of property, that to
which a person has a right, and things on which people rely, can be discerned from recent
Supreme Court decisions. See Statutory Entitlement, supra at 695.
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erty 7 and overlooks the economic realities of the finance industry.3 8 Fi-
nally, summary affirmations by the Supreme Court of lower court
opinions, particularly opinions dealing with questions of constitutional
law, are of limited precedential value.39
Spielman's applicability to real estate attachments is doubtful since
mechanic's lien statutes require at least an allegation that the person
seeking the lien has improved the property in question. Real estate, how-
ever, can be attached on many other grounds and in a few states can be
attached on almost any pretext.40 The mechanic's lien is foreseeable and
is less burdensome to the property owner than unforeseeable real estate
attachments. Consequently, real estate attachments should be subject to
tighter constitutional safeguards than are applicable to the imposition of
mechanic's liens on real estate.
The majority of United States courts have not followed the Chehalis
holding that attachment of real estate does not involve significant prop-
erty rights. Most courts have simply taken judicial notice of the fact that
land attachments amount to deprivation of a constitutionally significant
property right.41 If the validity of this premise is accepted, the issues
5 The reluctance of some American courts to recognize the right of property owner-
ship as including the right to dispose of one's property free of outstanding attachments or
mechanic's liens appears anomalous when considered in light of the civil law definition of
property. The civil law concept of property is the substantial equivalent of ownership in fee
simple absolute under the common law. See, e.g., LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 491 (West, 1952).
See also 0. BROWDER, R. CUNNINGHAM AND J. JULIN, BASIC PROPERTY LAW 79 (2d ed. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as BROWDER, CUNNINGHAM & JULIN]. Perhaps the reluctance of courts to
consider the right of alienability as an interest subject to fifth and fourteenth amendment
protection stems from the fact that the common law concept of property is still much closer
to the primitive view of property. Under the primitive view, property is that which one
physically possesses. In contrast the more sophisticated civil law conception of property ex-
tends beyond mere physical possession. See BROWDER, CUNNINGHAM & JULIN, supra at 76.
See also J. BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION (6th ed. R. Hildreth trans. 1890) 112
(property denotes an established expectation of being able to draw an advantage from the
thing possessed).
31 See Constitutionality of Mechanic's Liens, supra note 35, at 1077-79. The existence
of a mechanic's lien on real estate often prevents the sale of the property involved and
curtails full enjoyment of the property by preventing the owner from obtaining the financ-
ing necessary to make improvements. Id. at 1079.
" Id. at 1081 n.84. See also Tully v. Griffin, 429 U.S. 68, 74 (1976); Fusari v. Steinburg,
419 U.S. 379, 391-92 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671
(1974); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 343-44 (1969) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring). But see Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 829 (1977); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332,
343-45 (1975).
40 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-279 (West 1958), § 52-285 (West Supp. 1979);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 3501, 3508 (1974); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 4101, 4451,
4452 (1964).
41 See, e.g., Hutchison v. Bank of N.C., 392 F. Supp. 888, 894 (M.D.N.C. 1975); Clement
v. Four N. State St. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 933, 935 (D.N.H. 1973); Gunter v. Merchant's War-
ren Nat'l. Bank, 360 F. Supp. 1085, 1090 (D. Me. 1973). Courts have advanced several rea-
sons for the assumption that real estate attachments effect the deprivation of a significant
property interest. The existence of an attachment impairs, if not inhibits, the ability to sell
real estate. Also, attachment of real estate harms the owners's credit rating in the commu-
nity. Finally, real estate attachments restrict the owner's ability to utilize and enjoy the land
by making it impossible to obtain the necessary financing to make improvements to the
1980]
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relevant to the constitionality of real estate attachment statutes are much
the same as issues concerning the constitutional validity of statutes pro-
viding for attachment of personal property.
The Washington real estate attachment statutes"2 involved in Chehal-
is provide that an attachment is initiated by filing with the clerk of court
an affidavit containing conclusory allegations that the defendant is in-
debted to the plaintiff in the amount stated in the affidavit; that the ac-
tion is not sought to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor of the defen-
dant; and that the defendant or cause of action falls into one of ten
specified categories.' 3 The defendant may move to discharge the attach-
ment anytime after appearing in the action. Under the Washington stat-
ute, however, there is no requirement for an immediate hearing following
the filing of a motion for dissolution of the attachment. In Chehalis, the
Ninth Circuit relied on the statement in Mitchell that an immediate
post-seizure hearing will satisfy due process requirements for attachment
of personal property.44 Under the Washington attachment statute, how-
ever, a post-seizure hearing could be delayed for months. Such delay
clearly would not comport with due process requirements. Also, the Ninth
Circuit ignored the fact that under the Washington statute, a writ of at-
tachment for real estate may be issued upon mere conclusory allegations
without participation of judicial officers. In addition, the Washington
statute fails to require that the plaintiff post bond if the real estate at-
tached belongs to a non-resident corporation.
45
property. See MPI v. McCullough, 463 F. Supp. 887, 901 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (noting substan-
tial economic effects resulting from attachment); Terranova v. Avco Finc'l Servs., 396 F.
Supp. 1402, 1406 (D. Vt. 1975) (attachment places economic burden on real estate owner).
42 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.12.010-.330 (1961) & Supp. 1978-79).
4 Id. § 7.12.020 (1961).
4 526 F.2d at 506-07.
41 See text accompanying notes 31-36 supra. In First Recreation Corp. v. Amoroso, 26
Ariz. App. 477, 549 P.2d 257 (1976), the Arizona Court of Appeals upheld real estate at-
tachment statutes, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1521 to -1539 (1956). Employing a method
of analysis similar to that used by the Chehalis court, the Amoroso court relied principally
on Spielman for finding that attachment of real estate does not constitute the taking of a
significant property interest. 26 Ariz. App. at - , 549 P.2d at 259-60. The Arizona attach-
ment statute provides that attachments must be issued by a judge, but there is no provision
for an early post-seizure hearing. In fact, in the situation under scrutiny in Amoroso, a hear-
ing was not held on the validity of the attachment until more than two months after a
hearing had been requested. 26 Ariz. App. at - , 549 P.2d at 258-59.
The Montana Supreme Court also has held the Montana attachment statute constitu-
tional as applied to real estate. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. 93-4301 to -4347 (1973). See Bustell
v. Bustell, 170 Mont. 457, 555 P.2d 722 (1976). The court relied primarily on Chehalis and
Spielman, implying that the attachment of real estate does not constitute the taking of a
significant property interest. 170 Mont. at -, 555 P.2d at 724. The Bustell court also relied
on the fact that the Montana statute provides for an early post-seizure hearing, and requires
that the plaintiff post bond prior to the issuance of a writ of attachment. The writ of attach-
ment, however, was issued by the clerk of the court upon conclusory allegations without the
participation of a judicial officer. 170 Mont. at - , 555 P.2d at 722-23. See MONT. Rav.
CODES ANN. §§ 93-4302, -4304, -4329 (1973) (§ 93-4301 amended 1977, § 93-4302 repealed
1977). Montana's attachment statutes, as applied to garnishment of wages, were later de-
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In Hutchison v. Bank of North Carolina,'46 the court held North Caro-
lina's attachment statute 7 constitutional as applied to real estate. The
North Carolina attachment statute permits issuance of a writ of attach-
ment by the clerk of court. In North Carolina, however, the clerk of court
is a judicial officer as opposed to an administrative functionary. The
North Carolina statute requires more than mere conclusory allegations
for the issuance of a writ of attachment.48 The Hutchison court further
noted that North Carolina law provides that the owner of attached prop-
erty can move at any time for a dissolution of the attachment and receive
an early hearing on such a motion.49 The North Carolina attachment stat-
ute is narrow enough that attachment can only be obtained when neces-
sary to afford quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over property which might other-
wise be unavailable to satisfy a judgment because of assignment or
removal by the defendant. Finally, the court noted with approval the pro-
visions of the statute which require that the plaintiff post a bond for the
defendant's protection. Unlike the Chehalis court, the district court in
Hutchison carefully analyzed each provision of North Carolina's attach-
ment statute in light of the constitutional guidelines delineated by the
four Supreme Court decisions dealing with garnishment and
attachment.51
The statutes dealt with in Chehalis and Hutchison were limited at-
tachment statutes.5 2 Additional problems arise in assessing the constitu-
tionality of general attachment statutes. Terranova v. Avco Financial
Services53 illustrates some of these difficulties. Under Vermont's general
attachment statute, real estate attachment is initiated by delivery of a
completed writ to the sheriff of the county in which the real estate is
located.54 The defendant is not provided with notice of the attachment or
clared unconstitutional in Williams v. Matovich, 172 Mont. 109, 560 P.2d 1338 (1977), on
grounds that writs of attachment were issuable by clerks of court upon conclusory allega-
tions and that under the Montana statutes, the burden of proving that the writ of attach-
ment was improperly issued was placed on the defendant. The court also found the fact
situation in Williams very similar to that in Sniadach. 172 Mont. at -, 560 P.2d at 1341.
The Williams court did not refer to Bustell. Apparently the Williams court felt that Bustell
was not controlling solely because of the Bustell court's implication that Bustell did not
involve the attachment of a significant property interest. See also Central Security Nat'l
Bank v. Royal Homes, 371 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Mich. 1974). The Royal Homes case held that
although an invalid attachment may represent an unwarranted intrusion on one's property
rights, such an intrusion is necessary to reach the merits of the underlying issue of liability,
id. at 480, and is no greater than necessary to protect the creditor's legitimate interests. Id.
at 482.
48 392 F. Supp. 888, 896 (M.D.N.C. 1975).
47 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-440.10 to .57 (1969).
48 Id. at 897.
49 Id.
80 Id. at 898.
1 Id. at 894, 898, see text accompanying notes 8-29, supra.
62 See note 1 supra.
1- 396 F. Supp. 1402 (D. Vt. 1975).
Id. at 1403-1404; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3291-3292 (1973).
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with an opportunity for a hearing at any time prior to the filing of the
suit which forms the basis of the attachment. At no time is a judicial
officer involved in the attachment proceedings prior to the trial of the
case.5 The Terranova court held the attachment statute unconstitu-
tional, reasoning that the Sniadach line of cases requires judicial partici-
pation in the issuance of writs of attachment. The Terranova court ob-
served that after the Fuentes decision, Vermont's attachment statute
was amended to provide for a hearing prior to the attachment of per-
sonal property, but that the hearing requirement was inapplicable to at-
tachments of real estate. The court proscribed pre-judgment attachment
of real estate belonging to Vermont residents except when the owner is
given notice and the opportunity for a hearing before a judicial officer."
At the hearing, the judicial officer must find that the plaintiff is likely to
recover a judgment which, including interest and court costs, is equal to
the value of the attached property. The prior hearing requirement is in-
applicable, however, when there is a possibility of fraudulent transfer,
substantial damage to, or depreciation of the property to be attached.
5 7
The Terranova decision presents two problems. First, the requirement
of a prior hearing appears to be anomalous in light of the Mitchell and
Di-Chem decisions dispensing with the requirement of a prior hearing
where the attachment statute provides for a prompt post-seizure hearing.
396 F. Supp. at 1403-04, 1403 nn.1&2.
Id. at 1407.
5 Id. at n.8. Prior to the Terranova decision, two general attachment statutes had been
declared unconstitutional as applicable to real estate attachments. The Maine attachment
statutes invalidated in Gunter v. Merchants Warren Nat'l Bank, 360 F. Supp. 1085, 1086 &
n.3 (D. Me. 1973), required that the plaintiff's attorney complete a writ of attachment and
give the writ to a sheriff in order to effect an attachment. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§
4451, 4454 (1965); ME. R. Civ. P. 4A(b), 4A(c). The statute further provided that the defen-
dant could obtain a dissolution of the attachment prior to the termination of the underlying
action only by furnishing a surety bond. 260 F. Supp. at 1087 n.5. The Gunter court decided
that real estate attachment involves the taking of a significant property interest because it
prevents owner from conveying a clear title to the attached property. Id. at 1090. The fed-
eral district court held Maine's attachment statute unconstitutional on several grounds.
First, the statute did not apply only to those special situations where the plaintiff proved
that the defendant was about to encumber or otherwise alienate the property in question.
Second, no judicial officer was involved in the decision to issue an attachment. Finally, the
statute did not provide for a pre-attachment hearing. Id. at 1090-91.
Eight days after the Gunter decision, the same three judge district court invalidated a
New Hampshire attachment statute, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 5114.48, .53 (1955), which,
like the Maine statute considered in Gunter, provided for the issuance of a writ of attach-
ment without judicial participation. Clement v. Four N. State St. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 933,
935 (D.N.H. 1973). Although the New Hampshire statute provided for a post-seizure hear-
ing at which the defendant could move for a release of the attachment, there was no guar-
antee that such a hearing would be promptly provided. Id. Relying principally on Gunter,
the court found the New Hampshire statute unconstitutional. Id. See also United States
Gen. Inc. v. Arndt, 417 F. Supp. 1300, 1312-13 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (real estate attachment
unconstitutional since neither approval of attachment by judicial officer nor opportunity for
immediate post-seizure hearing required); McIntyre v. Associates Finc'l. Serve. Co., 367
Mass. 708 - , 328 N.E.2d 492, 494 (1975) (real estate attachment unconstitutional without
opportunity for hearing and prior notice to debtor) (dictum).
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However, Terranova's requirement of a prior hearing is an attempt to
reconcile Vermont's general attachment statute with the Sniadach line of
cases dealing with limited attachment statutes." The court attempted to
save Vermont's general real estate attachment statute by mandating a
preattachment hearing absent the extenuating circumstances which must
be present to secure an attachment of real estate under the laws of most
other states. Terranova implies that a prompt post-seizure hearing is re-
quired when extenuating circumstances exist.
A second problem posed by the Terranova decision is what extraordi-
nary circumstances will dispense with the requirement of a post-seizure
hearing. Obviously, merely alleging the existence of such circumstances in
the request for attachment is insufficient. Such a broad exception would
swallow the Terranova rule since such allegations are easily made. Re-
quiring all persons seeking an attachment without a prior hearing to ap-
pear before a judicial officer and present documentary evidence as t; the
alleged extraordinary circumstances may solve this problem. The judicial
officer would then determine whether the circumstances are sufficiently
extenuating to warrant attachment without prior notice and hearing.
Thus, although it is impossible to devise a checklist of features which
will assure the constitutionality of a given real estate attachment statute,
certain broad principles can be derived from the cases which are useful in
analyzing the constitutionality of such statutes. Generally, there must be
a post-seizure hearing at which the owner of the attached property may
contest the attachment. A judicial officer must review applications for
writs of attachment, and he must be satisfied of a genuine need for the
attachment. Also, writs of attachment may not issue on mere conclusory
allegations. In certain circumstances, a requirement that a plaintiff post
bond covering the attached property's value or that the defendant can
remove the attachment by posting bond will weigh in favor of the stat-
ute's constitutionality." A bond requirement, however, will not in itself
save a real estate attachment statute which is otherwise defective.
6 0
The real estate attachment staututes of states within the Fourth Cir-
cuit range from thorough compliance with due process requirements to
probable unconstitutionality. Virginia's attachment statutese l require the
8 See text accompanying notes 7-25 supra. The Supreme Court and lower federal court
decisions do not affect the continuing validity of general attachment statutes. In those states
in which general attachment statutes are in effect, attachment may still be had in any type
of legal action provided that the attachment statute complies with due process
requirements.
" See generally Hillhouse v. City of Kan. City, 221 Kan. 369, -, 559 P.2d 1148, 1153-
54 (1977) (statement of constitutionally required provisions for real estate attachment
statutes).
" Compare Hutchison v. Bank of N.C., 392 F. Supp. 888, 897-898 (M.D.N.C. 1975)
(bond requirement one of several desirable features causing federal district court to hold
attachment statute constitutional) with MPI v. McCullough, 463 F. Supp. 882, 891-92 (N.D.
Miss. 1978) (bond requirement alone will not save attachment statute which is radically
deficient in other respects).
" VA. CODE §§ 8.01-533 to -576 (1950).
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filing of an application for attachment before the clerk of court. The clerk
must review the application immediately. The party seeking the writ
must propertly attest the petition and must allege at least one ground for
attachment. A clerk of court or magistrate may issue a writ of attach-
ment.6 2 A defendant may obtain dissolution of an attachment by posting
a bond in an amount at least double the amount in controversy in the suit
which forms the basis of the attachment.6 3 A defendant may also move to
quash an attachment which appears to have been issued without suffi-
cient cause. 4 Since under Virginia law a clerk of court is an administra-
tive functionary 5 and the statute does not expressly provide for an expe-
ditious hearing on a motion to dissolve, Virginia's attachment statute is of
doubtful constitutionality.
66
In West Virginia, a writ of attachment is issuable only when the un-
derlying action or suit has been initiated.67 The plaintiff is required to
include in the affidavit a statement of the material facts necessitating at-
tachment.68 The defendant may have the attachment removed by posting
a bond equal to the amount of the attachment or the value of the prop-
erty attached.6 9 West Virginia law also permits contest of an attachment
by filing an answer.70 The post-seizure hearing provision appears consti-
tutionally suspect in that there is no requirement of an immediate hear-
ing following a request. In 1976, however, a West Virginia court held that
by proper compliance with the hearing provision, an immediate hearing
is available concerning the sufficiency of the facts underlying an attach-
ment.71 Except for the fact that the clerk of court may be acting in a
ministerial capacity when the writ of attachment is issued 7 2 the West
Virginia attachment statute is constitutionally sound. The provision that
an attachment is issued only in connection with the initiation of a lawsuit
62 Id. § 8.01-540.
63 Id. § 8.01-553.
04 Id. § 8.01-568.
6' See Town of Falls Church v. Myers, 187 Va. 110, 119, 46 S.E.2d 31, 36 (1948). How-
ever, clerks of circuit courts, but not clerks of lower courts, may appoint guardians and
admit wills to probate. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 8; VA. CODE §§ 31-4, 64.1-67, -75 (1950).
6 Requirements that a judge approve applications for writs of attachment and that the
defendant be given an opportunity for a prompt post-seizure hearing would place Virginia's
attachment statute on a sounder consitutional footing.
67 W. VA. CODE § 38-7-1 (1966).
60 Id. §§ 38-7-2, -3.
*' Id. §§ 38-7-10, -11, -20. In West Virginia and Virginia, statutes provide for two differ-
ent types of defendant's bonds, forthcoming bonds and performance of judgment bonds. A
performance of judgment bond discharges the lien on the property and becomes a substitute
for the res. In contrast, a forthcoming bond merely permits the defendant to retain physical
possession of the attached property while not affecting the attachment.
7 W. VA. CODE § 38-7-33 (1966).
71 Persinger v. Edwin Associates, - W. Va ... 230 S.E.2d 460, 464 (1976).
72 There is scant authority as to whether the clerk of court is considered a judicial
officer in West Virginia. The one relevant decision implies that the clerk of court is a minis-
terial official. See Starcher v. South Penn Oil Cor., 81 W.Va. 587, 593-94, S.E. 28, 30-31
(1918) (when court is not in session, clerks can appoint administrators, etc., but such ap-
pointments are subject to review by the court at next regular session).
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is especially desirable in that the potential use of attachment as a tool of
harassment and the possibility of an attachment remaining in force indef-
initely without the landowner's knowledge is virtually eliminated.
Under Maryland law, a petitioi for a writ of attachment must include
sworn, certified or photostatic copies of all relevant papers which consti-
tute the basis for the claim unless the absence of such documents is ex-
plained in the affidavit requesting attachment. 3 A writ of attachment is
issuable only at the direction of a court following a review of the docu-
ments substantiating the petition. 4 Maryland law also provides that if
the defendant cannot be served with a summons and does not voluntarily
appear at the trial of the case on the merits, the plaintiff must make a
reasonable effort to bring the attachment to the attention of the defen-
dant.75 The owner can move to quash an attachment, and upon notice to
the plaintiff, a hearing on the motion will be held.78 The defendant may
also obtain dissolution of the attachment by posting a bond in an amount
equal to the value of the attached property as determined by the court or
in the amount of the plaintiffs claim, whichever is less.77 The Maryland
attachment statutes, extensively revised in 1974 following Mitchell, afford
maximum procedural safeguards to the owner of attached property. The
statutes closely follow the due process requirements delineated by the
federal courts."
In contrast to the Maryland statutes, the South Carolina attachment
provisions are clearly inadequate. In South Carolina, a writ of attachment
is issuable by a circuit judge, or the judge, clerk of court or magistrate of
the court in which the underlying action is brought.9 The plaintiff must
file a bond for damages in case of wrongful pttachment.8 0 The defendant
may secure a release of the attachment by posting a bond of twice the
amount claimed by the plaintiff or twice the value of the attached prop-
erty, whichever is lesser.81 In regard to dissolution of the attachment, the
statute merely provides that the defendant may move to dissolve the at-
tachment.8 2 However, how soon a hearing must take place following such
a motion is unclear.8 3 Since participation of a judicial officer is not al-
73 MD. R.P. G42c (1977).
1 Id. G44. See also Overmyer v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 32 Md. App. 177, 185, 359
A.2d 260, 265 (1976) (issuance of writ of attachment reserved to court).
71 MD. R.P. G48 (1977).
76 Id. G51.
77 Id. G57.
78 See text accompanying notes 58-60 supra.
71 See S.C. CODE § 15-19-70 (1977).
:0 Id. at 15-19-80.
81 Id. § 15-19-310.
82 Id. § 15-19-340.
1 In Harrison v. Morris, 370 F. Supp. 142 (D.S.C. 1974), which involved an attachment
under the South Carolina attachment statute, a federal district court held that due process
requirements are satisfied by the preliminary hearing in the main action on which the at-
tachment is based. Id. at 148. The Harrison holding, however, certainly does not comport
with the great bulk of decisions in regard to attachment, which hold that at a minimum, due
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ways required,"' a writ seemingly is issuable upon conclusory allegations.
Additionally, a prompt, post-seizure hearing is not guaranteed. Thus,
South Carolina's attachment statute appears especially vulnerable to
attack.
In evaluating the constitutionality of real estate attachment statutes,
both plaintiffs and defendants have interests which deserve protection.
The plaintiff has an interest in insuring that a judgment in his favor
could be enforced. The availability of the remedy of attachment histori-
cally has not been limited to those situations in which extraordinary cir-
cumstances exist, such as probable destruction or encumbrance of the
property in question. The statutes of most states, however, limit the use
of the remedy to these extraordinary situations."s Traditionally attach-
ment has been available to any plaintiff who simply desires the peace of
mind which results from knowing that there will be property sufficient to
satisfy his claim.88 On the other hand, the defendant has an interest in
holding clear and unencumbered title to real property and in preventing
interference with his property rights through abuse of the attachment
remedy. During recent years, the federal courts have articulated stan-
dards which prescribe the minimum safeguards necessary to provide ade-
quate protection against abuses of the attachment process. The degree to
which property owners are protected against potential abuse of the rem-
edy of attachment appears to be determinative of the constitutionality of
real estate attachment statutes.
JOHN E. GREGORICH
process requires a prompt, post-seizure hearing following attachment. See text accompany-
ing notes 26-27 & 58-60 supra.
8, South Carolina statutes do not specifically provide that a clerk of court is a judicial
offiger. There is virtually no South Carolina authority on the question of whether a clerk of
court is a judicial or ministerial official.
" See M. ROSENBERG, J. WEINSTEIN, H. SMIT & H. KORN, ELEMENTS OF CIVIL PROCE-
DURE 152 (3d ed. 1976).
86 See note 1 supra.
